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staggering $12 billion in 2013, increasing to $27 billion in 2019. This budgetary imbalance
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and amid the recent global crisis. To explain the budgetary slump, the author points instead to
population aging, previous tax cuts, the multiplication of infrastructure investments, program
spending growth, expected slowdown of federal transfers, and expected rising interest rates on the
public debt. 
The Quebec government reacted to the situation by announcing a Plan to restore budgetary
balance by 2013/14. The author demonstrates that the Plan’s tax hikes ($4.3 billion), spending
cuts ($5.7 billion), and other measures ($2.2 billion) could, technically, restore the sustainability
of Quebec’s finances. Also, these measures are in line with public support for fiscal balance and
desire to reduce the size of government, while minimizing the impact on tax burdens and
economic growth. However, carrying out the planned spending cuts will prove politically and
administratively difficult. 
The author believes the government should maintain its fiscal plan and stay the course on
restoring budgetary balance by 2013/14, while launching vast healthcare reforms and promoting
productivity growth by concentrating its interventions in education, access to foreign markets,
competition, taxation, and public infrastructure.
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I
n the past two provincial budgets,
the financial outlook for Quebec
has taken a turn for the worse. In
March 2009, Quebec Finance
Minister Monique Jérôme-Forget
presented her last Budget (Finances
Québec 2009). That document
revealed that unless revenue and
expenses were seriously adjusted, the
Quebec government was headed for a
budgetary deficit of $10 billion in
2013/2014. A year later, in March
2010, the 2010/2011 Budget
presented by her successor Raymond
Bachand confirmed and expanded on
this diagnosis. He calculated that, if
no changes were made, the deficit
would exceed $12 billion in
2013/2014 (Finances Québec
2010a). The December 2010
Economic and Financial Update
confirmed this projection (Finances
Québec 2010b).
By revealing that Quebec was headed towards
this financial impasse, ministers Jérôme-Forget
and Bachand surprised everyone because the
Quebec government had, since 1998, managed to
comply with the Balanced Budget Act of1996,
prohibiting it from running up deficits. From
1998/1999 to 2008/2009, Quebec had shown an
average budgetary surplus of $54 million
(Finances Québec 2010a, table I.11). This success
was confirmed by a progressive rise in its standing
with credit rating agencies (Finances Québec
2010a, section D.4). Quebec was still the
Canadian province with the highest debt-GDP
ratio, but its financial situation was constantly
improving. Since then, however, the budget
outlook has taken a decided turn for the worse.
Without Corrective Measures, the Deficit could
Reach $27 Billion in 2019/2020.
Table 1 reproduces and extends Minister
Bachand’s projection of what would happen in the
absence of corrective measures. The starting point
is 2007/2008, the year of the cyclical peak. It is
followed by the year of the recession, 2009/2010,
then by the year 2013-2014, in which the deficit
was expected to exceed $12 billion if nothing was
done to redress the situation. In order to see
beyond this, I have extended the horizon until the
end of the current decade. This makes it possible
to ascertain that, in the absence of corrective
measures, a budgetary deficit of $27 billion would
emerge in 2019/2020. On that date, interest costs
on the debt would absorb 29 percent of the
government’s own-source revenue, the budgetary
balance would equal 6 percent of GDP, the debt
representing accumulated deficits would reach 60
percent of GDP, and the gross debt would be 85
percent of GDP.
The path followed would be explosive
1 and
unsustainable financially. The “if the trend is
maintained” type projection set out in Table 1 sees
total revenue grow less rapidly than GDP, and the
latter less rapidly than total expenditures from
2007 to 2019. Over this 12-year period, GDP
increases by 50 percent, budgetary revenues by 40
percent and budgetary spending by 90 percent.
On this basis, the budgetary deficit continually
increases as a proportion of GDP. 
I have two objectives in the following analysis.
The first is to determine the causes of Quebec’s
current budgetary difficulties. I raise three
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the members of the C.D. Howe Institute's Fiscal and Tax Competitiveness Council and the
Institute’s staff (especially Alexandre Laurin), as well as Kevin Page and his team, and the two very perceptive anonymous readers for their
comments and suggestions in preparing this study. 
1 In the sense of Liapounov (1892).| 2 Commentary 325
C.D. Howe Institute
Table 1: The Outlook: Actual Data from the Quebec Budget for the 2007/2008 and 2009/2010 Fiscal Years,
and Forecasts for the 2013/2014 and 2019/2020 Years in the Absence of Corrective Measures Applied to
Income Trends and Government Spending 
Note: The data presented in the first two columns of the table describe the real situation with respect to the economy and budget in
2007/2008 and 2009/2010. The data in the third column indicate what the government's financial situation would be in 2013/2014 if no
corrective measures were applied to the current trend. These data are extracted from Finances Québec budgetary documents and are in line
with the following hypotheses: 1) after 2009/2010, own-source revenue follows the annual GDP growth and the bases established by the
Ministry without any further change to the fiscal rules other than those already announced (such as eliminating the capital tax in 2011); 2)
federal transfers are in line with the parameters established until 2014/2015; 3) program spending increases by 4.6 percent per year, i.e., at a
slower rate than the average 5 percent recorded from 2002/2003 to 2009/2010; 4) interest expenses are paid according to the anticipated
change in the average interest rate on the government’s gross debt; interest rates increase from 3.8 percent in 2009/2010 to 4.9 percent in
2013/2014, and the gross debt accumulates annual budgetary deficits, net investments stemming from the government’s capital plan (health
and education establishments included) and its investments, loans and advances to various bodies; 5) the “other budget items” reproduce the
Ministry’s forecast; they include the net results of agencies that are not budget-related, special funds and networks, and subtract the provision
for contingencies and the change in the stabilization reserve. The budgetary balance is the algebraic sum of all of the preceding items. A
negative sum is the amount added to the debt representing accumulated deficits at the end of each fiscal year. In the fourth column, the
Finances Québec forecast without corrective measures is extended beyond 2013/2104 to the end of this decade. The following hypotheses are
applied: 1) GDP is in line with the Finances Québec forecast until 2014, at which time it is expected to reach its potential, then it pursues its
growth at the potential rate until 2019, set at 3.5 percent per year (2 percent inflation included); 2) own-source revenue growth reproduces
GDP growth each year; 3) federal transfers are in line with the Finances Québec forecast until 2014/2015, following which they increase at a
constant annual rate of 4.5 percent, chosen simply to reflect average Canadian GDP growth from 2014 to 2019 (forecast from Dungan and
Murphy) and, therefore, the federal government’s ability to pay; 4) program spending increases by 4.8 percent per year, i.e., at a rate that
remains slower than the average 5 percent recorded from 2002/2003 to 2009/2010; 5) the average interest rate on the gross debt increases
from 4.9 percent in 2014/2015 to 5.4 percent in 2019/2020, and the gross debt accumulates annual budgetary deficits and enables the
government to complete its investment plan; and 6) the “other items” progress at the same rate as GDP, i.e., 3.5 percent per year.











Own-source Revenues 49,464 47 ,994 55,457 68,599
Federal Transfers 13,629 15,161 15,784 20,462
Program Spending -54,826 -61,769 -73,695 -97 ,635
Debt Interest -7 ,021 -6,117 -10,717 -19,597
Other Items -797 2,092 852 1,047
Budgetary Balance 449 -2,449 -12,319 -27 ,117
Accumulated Deficits 97 ,125 107 ,617 144,334 264,955
Gross Debt 148,151 163,318 225,320 377 ,011
GDP 295,928 303,747 357 ,738 442,517
Interest/Own-source Revenue 14.2% 12.7% 19.3 % 28.6 %
Budgetary Balance/GDP  0.2% -0.8% -3.4 % -6.1 %
Accumulated Deficits/GDP 32.8% 35.4% 40.3 % 59.9 %
Gross Debt/GDP 50.1% 53.9% 63.0 % 85.2 %Commentary 325 | 3
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possibilities. The first would be the 2008/2009
recession that hit Quebec, as it did all other
regions of Canada and the world. The second
would be the long-term economic performance of
Quebec, which could have deteriorated over the
course of the past decades. The third would be the
imminent aging of the population, which will hit
both the revenue and expenditure sides of
Quebec’s public finances harder than other regions
of North America. I will show that the first two
explanations do not hold water, but that the third
– an aging population – is a real cause of the
difficulties encountered, but not the only one.
There is no single cause for the worsening
financial situation; it is rather the result of several
factors, some directly influenced by the
government and others beyond its control.
The second objective is to determine whether
this budgetary impasse can be resolved by a set of
administratively and politically sustainable
measures. I will argue that the Plan for a Return to
Fiscal Balance presented by Ministers Jérôme-
Forget and Bachand is a painful, but necessary
response under the circumstances. However,
although in principle this response enables Quebec
public finances to become sustainable once again,
in order for this to be also the case in practice, it
must become an administrative and political
reality and the government must stay the course.
This will be more difficult.
Cyclical or Structural Causes?
The Quebec Economy Actually Came Out of the
2008/2009 Recession Quite Well
To begin, Figure 1 shows that the Quebec
economy got through the 2008/2009 recession
better, and has had a stronger recovery since then,
than the rest of North America. Between late
2007 and the middle of 2009, the employment
rate dropped less in Quebec than in the other
provinces and the United States.
2 Since then, the
employment rate has recovered half of its loss in
Quebec, and about 10 percent elsewhere in
Canada. In the United States, the employment
rate has not moved since October 2009.
In March 2009, the Quebec government
calculated that the recession would generate a $2.4
billion revenue loss in 2009/2010 (Finances
Québec 2009, table C.4). Then, in March 2010, 
it estimated that in 2013/2014 GDP would still
be 2.4 percent lower than its potential (Finances
Québec 2010a, graph B.20) and that, if so, a
cyclical deficit of $1.4 billion would remain on
that date. The slow pace of return to potential
anticipated by the ministry may be too pessimistic.
But even if its forecast is realized, this $1.4 billion
cyclical loss of revenues would only represent 
11 percent of the $12 billion budgetary deficit
forecast for 2013/2014. The inevitable conclusion
is that most of the government’s financial problem
is structural.
The Quebec Economy’s Performance has not
Deteriorated in 20 Years.
Therefore, we are forced to consider the structural
causes of the problem. Could it be that the relative
performance of Quebec’s economy has suffered a
long-term deterioration and that the provincial
government’s sudden financial difficulties reflect
this deterioration? The trends of the last two
decades do not lend credence to this conjecture. It
is well established that, in absolute terms, the per
capita real domestic income
3 of Quebec, like that
of the six other non-hydrocarbon producing
Canadian provinces, is quite far from first place in
North America. But as shown in Figure 2,
between the cyclical peaks of 1989 and of 2007
the province’s comparative performance was better
2 The 2008/2009 recession is the shallowest Quebec has experienced in the post-war period. During the 1981/1982 and 1990/1992
recessions, the unemployment rate reached monthly peaks of 15.8 percent and 14.3 percent, respectively. In 2008/2009, the maximum
reached was 9 percent. At 7.9 percent in January 2011, the unemployment rate was only 1 point above the minimum for the past 35 years.
3 Real domestic income is equal to the ratio between nominal GDP and the final domestic demand price index. This is an estimate of the
buying power that GDP represents for the residents of a country or region.| 4 Commentary 325
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than that of these six other provinces. It was also
close to the US performance from 1998 to 2009,
after straying from it between 1989 and 1998.
The figure also confirms that the rise in oil and
natural gas prices increased per capita income of
the three Canadian hydrocarbon producing
provinces to a level completely out of reach of the
rest of the continent’s economy.
Figures 1 and 2 clearly show that the budgetary
difficulties announced by Jérôme-Forget and
Bachand do not stem from a comparative
weakening of Quebec’s overall economic
performance over the course of the last three years
or last two decades. Quebec’s relative position has
actually improved over that past period.
Starting Now, Demographic Aging is Going to
Change Things
Concern over Quebec’s economic performance is
actually related to the future rather than the past.
Starting in this decade, the aging of Quebec’s
population will suddenly bring the population
aged 15 to 64 (the main pool of potential workers)
to decrease and at the same time will accelerate
growth of the population aged 65 and older. 
Table 2 sets out these trends. First, we observe
that after increasing by 7 percent between 2000
and 2010, the Quebec population aged 15 to 64
will decrease by 1 percent from 2010 to 2020, and
by an additional 2 over the following decade.
Second, growth in the population aged 65 and
over will, on the contrary, accelerate significantly.
This population of seniors increased by 28 percent
from 2000 to 2010. It will increase by 40 percent
in the current decade, and by another 32 percent
in the 2020s. In 2010, there were 4.5 people aged
15 to 64 for each person aged 65 and older. The
ratio will be 3.2 in 2020, and 2.4 in 2030.
These changes will have inevitable
consequences. One is that the number of
Quebecers at work will increase more slowly
starting now and over the next two decades. A
higher proportion of the population aged 15 to 64
will undoubtedly want to be part of the
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Figure 1: Employment Rate of the Working-age Labour Force in Quebec, Other Provinces and the
United States, January 2008 to January 2011
Sources: Statistics Canada, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.negative demographic shock to the working-age
population will overwhelm the increase in its
participation rate. Unless there is a significant
acceleration in productivity during that period,
this means that gross domestic income and tax
revenues will also grow less quickly. 
At what pace will Quebec’s GDP grow in this
decade? The answer to this question depends not
only on changes in the population aged 15 to 64,
but also on other factors: the percentage of this
population that will participate in the workforce;
the annual number of hours each active person
will work; and the volume of production that will
be generated by each hour of work. There is great
uncertainty surrounding the future evolution of
these three factors. To sharpen the focus, I will use
the following assumptions: 1) real GDP is at its
potential level in 2007, returns to it in 2014, and
then remains there until 2019; 2) potential real
GDP grows by 1.75 percent each year from 2007
to 2014, and by 1.5 percent each year from 2014
to 2019; 3) real GDP and the general price level
conform to Finances Québec’s forecast (2010b,
table 12) from 2010 to 2014; and 4) the inflation
rate is 2 percent from 2014 to 2019.
These assumptions are neither the most
optimistic nor the most pessimistic in use and are
aimed at avoiding extremes.
4 One implication is
that the path followed by potential GDP is lower
than if it were to continue to grow at the same
average annual rate of 2.1 percent as from 1989 to
2007 (and as from 1999 to 2007). As a result,
potential GDP is  reduced cumulatively by 2.1
percent in 2013 and by 5.3 percent in 2019. Since
Commentary 325 | 5





















Figure 2: Per Capita Real Domestic Income in the United States, Quebec and in the Other Canadian
Hydrocarbon or Non-Hydrocarbon Producing Provinces, 1989 to 2009 (1989 Index = 100)
Sources: Statistics Canada, U.S. Department of Commerce.
4 Finances Québec (2005) proposed an estimate of 1.4 percent for the growth rate of potential GDP from 2010 to 2020; Godbout et al.
(2007), 1.2 percent for 2011 to 2021; Desjardins Études économiques (2009), 1.7 percent for 2009 to 2014, and 1.5 percent for 2014 to
2019; Finances Québec (2010a, table B.15), 1.4 percent for 2021 to 2025. The hypothesis retained here is close to that of Desjardins.| 6 Commentary 325
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the level of own-source revenue is affected
proportionately, it will be reduced by $1.2 billion
in 2013/2014 and by $3.8 billion in 2019/2020.
5
Another implication is that the level of actual
GDP forecast by the ministry for 2013/2014 is
0.3 percent lower than the potential level I have
just assumed, which means a cyclical shortfall of
$200 million in own-source revenue. By
assumption, cyclical conditions will no longer
have any effect on income afterwards.
Another consequence of the aging demographic
structure is that the financial pressure on program
spending, which is already strong, will be even
greater. This results from the fact that public
healthcare spending is on average six times greater
per person aged 65 and older than per person
under 65 years of age.
6 Given that aging usually
goes hand-in-hand with a drop in the
demographic weighting of children and
adolescents, one would be inclined to think that
the provincial government would be able to save
on daycare and education services. This is an
unjustified assumption. Given the recent rise in
the province’s birth rate, the Institut de la
statistique du Québec (2010) anticipates only a
small drop in the weight of the under 18
population, i.e., from 19.3 percent of total
population in 2010 to 18.8 percent in 2019. As
well, there is strong pressure in Quebec, as in
other provinces, to promote enrolment in
university education and to curb dropout rates.
This pressure could quickly absorb any fiscal
flexibility that demographic change could offer to
the education system.
So, what is the estimated overall effect of an
aging population on the budgetary balance
forecast in Table 1? To have an idea, I make two
observations. First, if starting in 2010 the
population of 15-64 year olds were to continue to
increase at the same rate as between 2000 and
2010 rather than slow down as anticipated, it
would exceed the baseline demographic projection
by 1.6 percent in 2013 and 7.1 percent in 2019.
7
All things being equal, this means that the
government’s own-source revenue would be $900
million higher in 2013/2014, and $4.9 billion
higher in 2019/2010, than indicated in Table 1.
Second, with respect to spending, I estimate that
5 Namely: 1.2 = 55.5*(1/(1 – 0.021) – 1) and 3.8 = 68.6*(1/(1 – 0.053) – 1).
6 According to the Canadian Institute for Health Information (2010, table E.1.11), the Quebec government’s per capita healthcare spending
in 2007 was $10,451 for persons aged 65 and over and $1,730 for those under 65, so that spending for seniors was 10,451/1,730 = 6.0 
times greater.
7 This statement stems from the following two considerations. On the one hand, the Quebec population of 15-64 year olds increased by 7.2
percent from 2000 to 2010 (Statistics Canada 2011, table 051-0001). On the other hand, the reference scenario from the Institut de la
statistique du Québec (2010) for this group anticipates a cumulative growth of 0.5 percent from 2010 to 2013 and cumulative decrease of
1.1 percent from 2013 to 2019.
Table 2: Change in Populations Aged 15 to 64 and 65 and Over in Quebec, 2000 to 2030
Note: Statistics Canada (2011, table 051-0001); Institut de la statistique du Québec (2010).
Year
Population (2010 = 100) Ratio
15 to 64 years 65 years and over Pop. 15-64/Pop. 65 +
2000 (Real) 93 78 5.4
2010 (Real) 100 100 4.5
2020 (Forecast) 99 140 3.2
2030 (Forecast) 96 184 2.4Commentary 325 | 7
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the aging process starting in 2010 would increase
the government’s annual healthcare spending
cumulatively by about $1.3 billion 2013/2014
and $5.1 billion in 2019/2020.
8 In total, these
estimated impacts of aging on revenue and
spending will have a combined negative effect on
the budgetary balance of about $2.2 billion in
2013/2014 and $10 billion in 2019/2020.
Demographic aging significantly changes the
outlook. It explains a large part – but not all – of
the slowdown in own-source revenue and increase
in public healthcare spending that will affect
provincial public finances in this decade. I now
turn to the other causes of the slowdown in own-
source revenue and federal transfers, and of the
rapid expansion of total program spending and
debt servicing.
The Other Sources of Budgetary
Difficulties
Beginning with own-source revenue, an absolute
drop of $1.5 billion from 2007/2008 to
2009/2010 is first reported in Table1, whereas one
would have expected an increase of about $3.5
billion in times of normal economic growth if
fiscal parameters had remained unchanged.
9 The
projected $48 billion in Table 1 for own-source
revenue in 2009/2010 is therefore $5 billion less
than one would have normally expected. Given
that the impact of the recession on own-source
revenue was estimated at $2.4 billion in
2009/2010 (Finances Québec 2009, table C.4), an
explanation is still needed for the residual $2.6
billion drop. According to the information in the
2009/2010 Budget, this drop is due to a set of tax
cuts previously voted on, and in particular a
significant personal income tax break and the
progressive elimination of the capital tax (Finances
Québec 2009, table C.8). The ensuing growth
then causes the value of these tax cuts to increase
over time. They can be evaluated at about $4.1
billion four years later, in 2013/2014, and $5.1
billion 10 years later, in 2019/2020.
10
Unstable Federal Transfers: Federal transfers are
mainly comprised of the Canada Health Transfer,
the Canada Social Transfer and the Equalization
Program. The eye-catching characteristic of these
transfers is the pattern of instability: a strong
increase from 1961 to 1984, a sudden drop from
1984 to 2004, an increase from 2004 to 2009, a
new slowdown anticipated from 2009 to 2013,
and a resumption expected afterwards. 
The data in Table 1 forecast rather weak growth
in transfers (1 percent per year) from 2009/2010
to 2013/2014. This results from the good
comparative performance of Quebec during the
2008/2009 recession, the termination of federal-
provincial agreements, and the ceiling to be
imposed by the federal government on the growth
8 The Institut de la statistique du Québec (2010) estimates that the demographic weight of the 65 and over population will increase from 15.3
percent in 2010 to 16.7 percent in 2013, then to 19.6 percent in 2019. With per capita public healthcare spending that is six times greater
for seniors than for younger individuals, the cumulative effect of this aging on public healthcare spending for the entire population will be
(6*0,167 + 0.833)/(6*0,153 + 0.847) – 1 = 4.0 percent in 2013 and (6*0,196 + 0.804)/(6*0.153 + 0.847) – 1 = 12.2 percent in 2019.
Assuming that healthcare spending tends to increase by 4.5 percent per year before taking aging into account, the budget credits of the
Quebec Ministry of Health and Social Services, which are $28 billion in 2010/2011, would increase to $31.9 billion (= 28.0*1.045
3) in
2013/2014 and $41.6 billion (= 28.0*1.045
9) in 2019/2020. Aging would therefore cumulatively add $1.3 billion (= 31.9*0.040) and $5.1
billion (= 41.6*0.122) in these two years, respectively. This impact calculation, based solely on two age groups (0-64 and 65 and over)
simplifies reality only for presentation purposes. A detailed impact calculation based on per capita healthcare spending for a large number of
age and gender groups basically leads to the same results.
9 What I mean by “normal” growth here is annual own-source revenue growth equal to a nominal GDP growth rate of 3.5 percent, which was
forecast for 2008 in the 2007-2008 Budget, and again for 2009 in the 2008/2009 Budget (Finances Québec 2007, table B.30; 2008, table
B.5). At the time, the significance of the coming recession had not yet been assessed.
10 Without the $2.6 billion in tax cuts in 2009/2010, own-source revenue would have been $50.6 billion instead of $48 billion that year. If the
same growth rate as nominal GDP from 2009 to 2013 is applied to these $50.6 billion, we find that own-source revenue would have been
$59.6 billion in 2013/2014 (= 50.6 x 357.7/303.7), which exceeds by $4.1 billion the $55.5 billion entered in Table 1. The same method
applied to 2019/2020 indicates that, without the tax cuts, own-source revenue would have been $73.7 billion (= 50.6 x 442.5/303.7), which
is $5.1 billion more than the $68.6 billion entered in Table 1.| 8 Commentary 325
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rate of equalization payments. There is no agreed-
upon criterion for defining a counterfactual for
the growth of federal transfers to Quebec from
2009/2010 to 2019/2020. For the purposes of
analysis, I use as a benchmark the percentage of
Quebec’s GDP these transfers represented in
2009/2010, namely 5 percent. The federal
transfers projected in Table 1 for 2013/2014 and
2019/2020 are, respectively, $2.1 billion and $1.7
billion less than levels corresponding to this
benchmark.
11
Debt Servicing Costs: On the expenditure side, in
Table 1, the behaviour of interest charges on the
debt after 2009/2010 appears surprising at first
sight. They begin by decreasing by 13 percent in
the first two years, going down from $7.0 billion
in 2007/2008 to $6.1 billion in 2009/2010. But
then they triple in 10 years, climbing to $19.6
billion in 2019/2020. To gain a clear perspective,
it should be recalled that “servicing the debt”
consists of paying an average interest rate on the
gross debt, which is in turn equal to the sum of
the debt representing past accumulated budgetary
deficits and the non-budgetary debt taken out to
make investments. The latter is comprised mainly
of the government’s net fixed capital formation
(the depreciation expense being part of program
spending), net fixed capital formation by health,
social services and education establishments, and
government investments, loans and advances. In
other words, we have:
Debt servicing = Average interest rate x
(accumulated deficits +net accumulated investments)
Debt servicing changes from one year to the
next are due, by definition, to combined changes
in these three elements: average interest rate, debt
representing accumulated deficits and debt taken
out to finance investments. The budgetary data
indicate that the average interest rate on the gross
debt decreased from 4.8 percent in 2007/2008 to
3.8 percent in 2009/2010 – a 20 percent drop –
which explains that interest expenses decreased
between these two years despite the increase in
gross debt.
12 The calculations made in Table 1
then assume that the average interest rate on gross
debt will increase significantly, to 4.9 percent in
2013/2014, and then 5.4 percent in 2019/2020.
The impact on debt servicing is significant. In
2013/2014, should the average interest rate
suddenly drop to 3.8 percent instead of settling at
4.9 percent as projected, the government would
save $2.5 billion in interest expenses. A similar
occurrence in 2019/2020 would result in savings
of $5.8 billion.
13
The second element of the equation, debt
representing accumulated deficits, is a major
contributor to debt servicing expansion, since the
projected level for 2019/2020 is two and a half
times higher than for 2009/2010 ($265 billion
versus $107.6 billion). It cannot, however, be seen
as an independent cause for the change in budgetary
deficits since it is the result of these deficits.
The third element, debt used to finance net
investments, doubles in 10 years: from $55.7
billion in 2009/2010 to $81 billion in 2013/2014,
then to $112.1 billion in 2019/2020.
14 From 18.3
percent of GDP in 2009/2010, it increases to
22.6 percent in 2013/2014 and to 25.3 percent in
2019/2020. Unlike debt representing accumulated
deficits, this component of debt is non-budgetary
in nature and can be considered an outside cause
11 Since 357.7*0.05 – 15.8 = 2.1 and 442.5*0.05 – 20.5 = 1.7.
12 For a given financial year, the average interest rate paid on the gross debt is estimated by dividing the interest expenses for the fiscal year by
the average gross debt level during the year, defined as the simple mean of the gross debt levels at the beginning and end of the year. 
13 Since 2.5 = 10.7*(1 – 3.8/4.9) and 5.8 = 19.6*(1 – 3.8/5.4).
14 The ministry has presented a separate forecast until 2014//2015 for the debt taken out to finance net investments. Afterwards, the forecast is
mine. For the specific years represented in Table 1, it can be obtained simply by subtracting the debt representing accumulated deficits from
the gross debt.Commentary 325 | 9
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of debt servicing and the structural deficit. From
2009 to 2014, the government will have spent
$43 billion on a major plan to invest in public
infrastructures, in order to make up for long-
overdue maintenance, and support the economy
during the economic downturn (Finances Québec
2010a, graph C.5) The decision to go ahead with
this plan leads to an acceleration of both the
depreciation expense included in government
program spending and of the debt incurred to
finance investments. If the growth rate of this debt
had been the same as that of GDP from 2009 to
2019, debt servicing would have been smaller by
$800 million in 2013/2014 and $1.7 billion in
2019/2020.
15
Surging Program Spending: Although the
projection in Table 1 has debt servicing increase
rapidly over the projection period, it is the surge
in program spending that is the main source of
budgetary expenditure growth during that period,
given that it constitutes nearly 90 percent of total
expenditures. In order to evaluate the
consequences of this surge, the projection imposes
an annual average rate of increase in program
spending of 4.6 percent from 2009/2010 to
2013/2014 and of 4.8 percent from 2013/2014 to
2019/2020. These growth rates are under the 5
percent observed on average in Quebec from
2002/2003 to 2009/2010, which was in turn one
of the lowest among all provinces during the same
period (Finances Québec 2010a, graph E.5).
Despite all this, growth rates of 4.6 percent to
4.8 percent pose a problem because they are still
higher than the annual average growth rate of 3.4
percent projected for nominal GDP over the
period from 2007 to 2019. If program spending
were to grow at this 3.4 percent rate (rather than
4.6 percent to 4.8 percent) for 10 years starting in
2009/2010, it would come to $70.4 billion in
2013/2014 and $86.1 billion in 2019/2020.
That’s $3.3 billion less than projected for
2013/2014 and $11.5 billion less for 2019/2020.
These gaps are large.
Like elsewhere in Canada, the health and social
services sector exerts the greatest pressure on the
growth of program spending in Quebec.
Expenditures in this area have increased by 6.1
percent per year on average from 2002/2003 to
2009/2010 and currently take up 45 percent of all
program spending (Quebec Treasury Board 2010).
Spending has also increased quickly during that
period in two smaller sectors: transportation (8.6
percent per year) due to maintenance work on the
road system, and family (7.1 percent per year) due
to rapid expansion in the number of low-fee
daycare spots. Spending has increased more
modestly in education (3.8 percent) and in other
government functions (2.8 percent).
The same sources of pressure on spending will
remain in the future. Accelerated aging over the
next two decades will add to the pressure on
health and social services spending. Investments in
the road system and urban transit will go on for
several years. The demand for daycare services,
still not entirely met, will grow with the recent
increase in the birth rate and women’s labour force
participation rate. As well, the education sector
will make  insistent demands for funding,
particularly at the university level and in favour of
the elementary and high school student population
with special learning problems. In the long run, it
too should follow the increased birth rate.
Projecting program spending at annual rates of
4.6 percent to 4.8 percent for the period from
2009/2010 to 2019/2020 reveals not only one,
but two major budgetary issues. The first is that
the overall increase in spending is too high given
the 3.4 percent baseline growth rate of government
revenues. The second problem is that, within a
globally restricted financial framework, accelerated
spending in the health and social services sector
will tend to crowd out spending in other sectors.
Only faster increase in public sector productivity,
an expanded role for the private sector in health
and social services, or an unprecedented increase
of the tax burden could prevent this from occurring.
15 Since 0.8 = (0.226 – 0.183)*357.7*0.049 and 1.7 = (0.253 – 0.183)*442.5*0.054.| 10 Commentary 325
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Does Quebec Suffer from a Systematic Bias
towards Deficits?
Table 3 sets out a summary of the government’s
budgetary difficulties reviewed above. The
preceding analysis has identified seven negative
impacts on the budgetary balance. Four of them
are beyond the control of the Quebec
government. These are:
1) poor current economic conditions;
2) incipient downturn in trend economic growth;
3) withdrawal of federal transfers, and
4) expected return of higher interest rates.
The three other impacts stem from the government’s
own decisions. These are:
1) tax cuts prior to 2009/2010;
2) rapid growth in program spending, and
3) pace of infrastructure investment.
Altogether, these seven impacts total $14.2 billion
in 2013/2014 and $29.6 billion in 2019/2020.
Without them, the budget would have shown a
surplus of $1.9 billion instead of a deficit of $12.3
billion in 2013/2014, and another surplus of $2.5
billion instead of a deficit of $27.1 billion in
2019/2020. 
The results shown in Table 3 indicate that, in
mid-2008, the Quebec government could
conclude that it had the flexibility of a $2 billion
surplus at the end of its five-year budget planning
horizon in 2013/2014. However, other factors
intervened: the large tax cuts announced in the
2007/2008 Budget came into effect, the
infrastructure plan took off, and interest rates,
which had decreased significantly since mid-2007,
were expected to  increase sooner or later. These
three changes absorbed the entire previous
flexibility of the 2009/2010 Budget.
At the same time, government circles were well
aware that real economic growth would
progressively decrease to 1.5 percent per year or
less due, in particular, to an aging population.
16 In
this context, a nominal growth rate of 4.5 percent
or more in program spending, as seen in previous
years, would become unsustainable, even if it was
already lower than growth rates seen in all other
provinces except British Colombia. As Robson
(2010) cautioned, there was always the temptation
to listen to suggestions not to worry about
increased spending in programs because
demographic change only happens slowly, like a
glacier. The problem, as we saw in Table 2, is that
the aging glacier is almost on us now. To top it off,
in the fall of 2008 and winter of 2009, the
financial crisis in the United States and the global
recession suddenly occurred. Based on the
estimates in Table 3, it is easy to imagine how, in
the space of only a few months, the $2 billion
surplus that was initially forecast for 2013/2014
became a deficit of over $10 billion.
Does this sudden about-face in the budgetary
balance reveal a systematic bias in favour of deficit
financing that would be more pronounced in
Quebec than elsewhere in Canada? The fact that
the accumulated level of public debt is higher in
Quebec than in the other provinces (Finances
Québec 2010a, graph D.5) could lead us to
believe this. However, if there ever was such a bias,
it would seem to be a phenomenon of the past.
Quebec public opinion on deficits and public
debt reached a turning point during the
1995/1996 financial crisis. Whatever the general
feeling before 1996, the goal of fiscal balance and
the Balanced Budget Act of 1996 were widely
supported and remain so. In September 2009, for
example, when asked if they were concerned
about the prospect of a deficit budget, 70 percent
of Quebec respondents answered in the
affirmative (Léger Marketing 2009). Strict
compliance with the Balanced Budget Act by
successive provincial governments from
1998/1999 to 2008/2009 reflected that opinion. 
The origin of the current financial difficulties,
described in previous sections and summarized in
Table 3, actually gives the impression of
conservative budget management that was short-
circuited by events rather than a congenital or
16 The Finances Québec (2005) study mentioned above anticipated an annual real GDP growth rate of 1.4 percent for 2010-2020.Commentary 325 | 11
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cultural appetite for debt. The tax cuts prior to
2009/2010 came at a time of rather comfortable
financial flexibility. The infrastructure plan
launched in 2007 had become essential because of
the advanced state of dereliction of the road
system, which was placing human lives in danger.
Restrictions on program spending growth were
perhaps still insufficient, but, as we have seen,
control over spending was even more lax in other
provinces. Finally, the other sources of the
2009/2010 budgetary reversal, namely the
financial crisis and the recession, the slowdown in
federal transfers and the prospect of interest rate
increases, formed a set of unfortunate
contingencies over which the government could
exercise little control.
The Proposed Plan for Restoring
Fiscal Balance
The government’s response to its deteriorating
finances is contained in the Plan for Restoring
Fiscal Balance first presented by the 2009/2010
Budget of Minister Jérôme-Forget and, in an
expanded version, by the 2010/2011 Budget of
Minister Bachand. The Plan consisted of
announcing measures for own-source revenue and
program spending spread over four years to restore
fiscal balance in 2013/2014. This targeted date for
restoring balance is one year later than in Alberta,
the same as in British Colombia, and sooner than
the dates set by the governments of Canada
(2014/2015) and of Ontario (2017/2018).
This decision was recently criticized by a
coalition of Quebec labour unions called Alliance
Table 3: Summary of Sources of Budgetary Difficulties for the Quebec Government, Forecasts for 
2013/2014 and 2019/2020 
Note: Author’s calculations (see explanations in text).
Source of Difficulty and Effects on the Budget
Controlled 2013/2014 2019/2020
($ Billions)
Effects on Own-source Revenue
– Cyclical Loss of Revenues No -0.2 0.0
– Tax Cuts Prior to 2009-2010 Yes -4.1 -5.1
– Underlying Slowdown in Growth





Effect on Federal Transfers 
– Reduced Below 5%  of GDP No -2.1 -1.7
Effect on Program Spending
– Growth at 4.7%  Per Year Instead of 3.4% 





Effect on Debt Servicing
– Increase in Interest Rates No -2.5 -5.8
– Accelerated Investments Yes -0.8 -1.7
Total Effect on the Budgetary Balance -14.2 -29.6| 12 Commentary 325
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sociale, which fears that restoring fiscal balance in
2013/2014 is premature and will plunge Quebec
back into crisis (Alliance sociale 2011). The
Alliance’s humanitarian motivation is commendable,
but there does not appear to be much ground for
its fears for three reasons. The first is that the
2008/2009 recession is the least pronounced in
modern Quebec history, that it hit the province
less hard than the rest of North America and
Europe, and that the recovery is well underway.
Support from government budgets when the
economy is in distress is highly advisable, but
there is no current distress in Quebec. 
The second reason is that the accumulated
debt-GDP ratio in Quebec is the highest among
Canadian provinces and, therefore, one that
should not be treated lightly. The third reason is
that, save in the event of a force majeure, postponing
the return to fiscal balance would only worsen the
financial impasse. The real choice facing Quebec
is to immediately address a $12 billion deficit or
to face one that is going to be twice the size in five
years. The choice is not between good or bad, but
between bad or worse. The reason why Quebec
sustained a serious budgetary crisis in 1996, for
example, is precisely because the interventions
required since 1993 had been put off. This
historic event showed that, save in an obvious
situation of economic crisis, budgetary
procrastination is a poor choice.
Table 4 summarizes the content of both
versions of the plan for restoring fiscal balance.
Four characteristics stand out. First, the Plan does
not take half measures. Not only is fiscal balance
restored in 2013/2014, but, at least as designed,
the Plan resolves the difficulties anticipated until
2019/2020. Once the Plan’s measures are
incorporated in the budget, Finances Québec
(2010b, table A.16) forecasts own-source revenue
at $60.2 billion and program spending at $67
billion in 2013/2014. If the last billion dollars in
yet undetermined measures is equally divided
between increased own-source revenue and
decreased program spending, and if, afterwards,
own-source revenue increases in proportion to
GDP, program spending increases at the average
rate of 3.4 percent per year, and federal transfers
and “other elements” of the budget follow the
paths set out in Table 1, then the budget balance
will show a $3.2 billion surplus in 2019/2020. In
that year, debt servicing would absorb 15 percent
of own-source revenue, the debt representing
accumulated deficits would decrease to 23 percent
of GDP, and the gross debt would be 48 percent
of GDP.
Second, the intention expressed by the Plan is
to concentrate intervention mostly on budgetary
cuts (47 percent) and on tighter control of tax
evasion (10 percent), rather than on increasing the
tax burden for honest citizens (35 percent). In its
most recent version, the Plan aims at reducing the
rate of increase in program spending to 2.1
percent over the three years 2011/2012,
2012/2013 and 2013/2014 (Finances Québec
2010b, table 34).
Third, planned tax and tariff increases ($4.3
billion), although major, are about of the same
order of magnitude as the tax cuts granted prior to
2009/2010, which are estimated at $4.1 billion in
Table 3. These tax hikes will therefore result in
restoring the pre-2007 tax burden rather than
increasing it relative to what it was five years ago.
Fourth and finally, the Plan avoids increases in
the capital tax, the corporate income tax and the
personal income tax. Instead, it puts forward
increases in the Quebec sales tax, and increases in
user fees in the form of a general indexation of
existing fees and of a new health premium.
Will the Plan Succeed?
If applied to the letter, the Plan for Restoring
Fiscal Balance passes the three-pronged financial,
political and economic test. Financially, if realized,
it will secure the sustainability of Quebec’ public
finances for the foreseeable future. Politically, the
Plan is in line with the massive support of public
opinion for fiscal balance (Léger Marketing 2010
a). Moreover, by relying more on a spending
slowdown than on tax increases, the Plan complies
with public support for a reduction in the size of
government (Léger Marketing 2010b).Commentary 325 | 13
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Economically, based on results of contemporary
research on the subject (see, for example, Dahlby
2008; Chen and Mintz 2009), the increases in
consumption taxes and user fees will be less
damaging for investment and economic growth
than increases in the capital tax, the corporate
income tax or the personal income tax would 
have been.
Even if the Plan is deemed acceptable in theory,
whether it can in fact become a reality obviously
remains to be seen. It’s not a done deal. There is
no assurance of its administrative or political
feasibility. On the administrative level, the
planned cuts consist of reducing by $5.7 billion,
or 8 percent, the $74 billion in program spending
that would otherwise be reached in 2013/2014 if
the trend of recent years were maintained (see
Table 1). This is going to be a complex and
difficult undertaking. So far, it is based on two
sets of guidelines: the government’s Bill 100
introduced by Minister Bachand in June 2010,
and the Action Plan for Reducing and Controlling
Spending submitted by Treasury Board Minister
Michelle Courchesne in November 2010
(Finances Québec 2010b, table 48 and 49;
Quebec Treasury Board 2010b). The measures
mentioned include a reduction in public
administration costs ($2.6 billion), a review of
several government programs ($1 billion), stricter
fiscal discipline ($1.7 billion), and reduced
spending for government corporations and other
public bodies ($500 million).
To succeed, this undertaking must show respect
for government employees (civil servants, teachers,
nurses, police officers, etc.) and be implemented
with their full cooperation. Everything must also
be tried to slow down spending by lowering
production costs for public services (the intelligent
approach) rather than only reducing their volume
and quality (the stupid approach). The urgency of
increasing government productivity through an
in-depth review of existing practices rather than
through marginal adjustments to these practices is
particularly obvious in the health and social
services sector. Since 1988, there have been no less
than nine reports from committees, commissions
and task forces filled with proposals for improving
the system’s performance, most of which have not
translated into action.
17 It is time to take what
these reports have recommended seriously before
denial and procrastination end up leading to an
all-out crisis.
Table 4: Summary of the Quebec Government’s Plan for Restoring Fiscal Balance for 2013-2014, 
2009/2010 and 2010/2011 Budget Versions 






$ Million $ Million Percent
Increase in Own-source Revenue
Including: Increases in Taxes and User










Spending Slowdown 3,398 5,734 47
Measures Yet to be Identified 3,770 1,015 8
Total Planned Measures $ 9,528 $ 12,226 100%
17 The reports are in the names of Messrs. Rochon, Côté, Arpin, Anctil, Clair, Bédard, Deschênes, Ménard and Castonguay.| 14 Commentary 325
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On the political level, the budgetary strategy
adopted has already come at a high cost to the
government. Recent Léger Marketing polls (2009;
2010a; 2010b) indicate that Quebecers are quite
concerned with the budget deficit (70 percent);
opposed to Quebec sales tax increases (60 percent)
and government fee increases (65 percent); very
much in favour of various measures for reducing
spending (63 percent to 91 percent); but skeptical
about the government’s ability or determination to
cut spending and achieve fiscal balance by
2013/2014 (82 percent).
18 As a result, they are
broadly dissatisfied with the 2010/2011 Budget
(74 percent). Moreover, despite strong support 
for reducing spending in general, active resistance
to specific spending cuts from each individual
group that will be affected by a reduction or loss
of benefits is naturally to be expected. The
political fragility of the Charest government,
which is quite considerable at this time, will not
make things easier.
Conclusion
In early 2009, the prospect of a growing fiscal
imbalance in Quebec suddenly appeared after 10
years of compliance with the province’s Balanced
Budget Act and moderate growth in program
spending. This imbalance was structural in nature.
It did not stem chiefly from the 2008/2009
recession, which was rather moderate in Quebec.
If nothing were done, the budget deficit would
persist and worsen, even after the economy
returned to full employment. The financial
imbalance was not the result, either, of any
deteriorating performance of the Quebec
economy over the past two decades. On the
contrary, over the past 20 years, per capita real
domestic income in Quebec has increased
somewhat faster than in the six other non-
hydrocarbon producing Canadian provinces and
as rapidly as in the United States.
Without corrective measures, this fiscal
imbalance would not have been financially
sustainable. The government estimated the
budgetary deficit at $12 billion in 2013/2014. In
this commentary, I have further estimated that,
without corrective measures, the deficit was on
track to reach $27 billion in 2019/2020, and
would continue to increase thereafter faster than
GDP. The debt-to-GDP ratio would be on an
explosive path.
In addition to the modest and temporary effects
of poor market conditions, this analysis has found
several causes for the expected deterioration of the
budgetary situation: demographic aging that
would slow down economic growth while adding
pressure on health spending; the pre-2009 tax
cuts; accelerated investment in infrastructure; the
growth of program spending, which, although
more moderate than in the rest of Canada, still
exceeded GDP growth; the announced slowdown
of federal transfers; and the expected return of
higher interest rates on the debt.
The government reacted to the situation
promptly by presenting a Plan for Restoring Fiscal
Balance in the 2009/2010 and 2010/2011
budgets. If applied as stated, this Plan could
restore the financial sustainability of the province’s
finances. It is in line with public opinion, which is
clearly in favour of eliminating deficits and
reducing the size of government. It is based more
on slowing down spending than increasing taxes.
And, to minimize the damage to economic
growth, it relies on increases in consumption taxes
and user fees for public services rather than on
increases in the capital tax or income taxes.
Therefore, the Plan passes the three-pronged
financial, political and economic test.
But all is not won on the administrative and
political levels. It remains to be seen if spending
restraint can be implemented in full respect for
government employees and with their cooperation;
if the proposed cuts of nearly $6 billion (2 percent
of GDP) will be based on an in-depth review of
18 Public opinion has also shown reluctance towards the new $200/year health premium, which is a flat amount independent of income, as well
as towards the suggested $25 fee per medical visit. Laurin (2010) has provided a thorough analysis of these measures. The proposal of the fee
per medical visit was withdrawn by Minister Bachand in September 2010.Commentary 325 | 15
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existing practices and on a significant increase in
government productivity or simply on blind cuts
to services without a review of existing practices;
and if the government is able to overcome the
inevitable political resistance from individual
groups affected by the spending cuts.
What directions would we like to see adopted in
the 2011/2012 Budget? In my opinion, the
government should, first of all, clearly state that it
is staying the course with the Plan for Restoring
Fiscal Balance announced in the two previous
budgets. It should avoid procrastinating for three
reasons: 1) the economic recovery is well underway
in Quebec, which means that the time is appropriate
for budgetary adjustments; 2) government debt is
large and is there is no room for complacency; and
3) all postponements of the necessary measures
would only increase the magnitude of the
adjustments that would have to be made later.
Quebecers are in favour of fiscal balance, minimal
tax and fee hikes, and spending restraint. But they
doubt the government’s ability and determination
to carry out the restraint. The government will
have to provide them soon with reasons for
believing in the success of the undertaking. 
Second, a vast operation to reform healthcare
with the cooperation of all stakeholders is a matter
of national urgency. After the nine reports that
have been filed in Quebec over the last 20 years,
now is the time for action. Health must remain
universally accessible, but the sector must be made
more competitive. This can be achieved by
providing, as in many European countries, certain
additional roles for the private sector. This would
help to have clear ideas in mind and tangible
results in hand for the discussions that are about
to take place over the future of the Canada Health
Transfer. Everything must be on the table when
these discussions begin, including replacing
federal health transfers with greater fiscal
responsibility on the part of provinces, as well as
introducing greater flexibility into the Canada
Health Act. Failing to reform the healthcare sector
and to better circumscribe the room it will occupy
in the public budget would result in a destruction
of the government’s other essential missions. That
would be a tragedy.
Third, the economy needs help to deal with the
challenge of an aging population. Aging will put
up a barrier to economic growth by decreasing the
proportion of the population aged 15 to 64. The
negative impact on employment, production and
domestic income can be mitigated by encouraging
more adults to become and remain active, and
working more hours. But this has limits. We
cannot, after all, make more than 100 percent of
adults capable of working work more than 100
percent of the time! That is why, if we want to
prevent population aging from slowing down the
economy, the value produced by each hour
worked, namely productivity, must be accelerated.
However, Quebec’s productivity, as in the rest 
of the country, is 20 percent behind American
productivity. How can this gap be filled? The
ultimate source of productivity gains is new ideas
on what to do and how to do it, realized by
investment and funded by savings. The generation
and application of new ideas are above all a
cultural phenomenon encouraged by institutions
that promote freedom, emulation, perceptiveness,
effort, entrepreneurship, knowledge, dialogue and
social cohesion. My colleagues at the Canadian
Institute for Advanced Research and at the C.D.
Howe Institute have identified the buttons to
push – in the Budget and elsewhere – to increase
the chances for Quebec and Canada to have a
more productive economy: education, access to
markets, competition, taxation and public
infrastructures.
19 It “just” takes educating our
children, building an open society by warding off
monopolies, private preserves and political
clientism, taxing consumption rather than work,
savings, innovation and investment, and valuing
social solidarity and trust in all of their forms.
Nothing more.
19 See in particular Rosenberg and Birdzell (1987), Helpman (2004, 2008), McCain, Mustard and Shanker (2007), Trefler (2008), Task Force
on Business Investment (2008), and Chen and Mintz (2009).| 16 Commentary 325
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